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Abstract
This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally
testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this
rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a
tax authority, so that the audit probability depends on the joint decisions among the taxpayers.
We compare the bounded rule to the widely studied at-rate rule, where taxpayers are informed
that they will be audited with a constant probability. The experimental evidence shows that,
as theoretically predicted, the bounded rule induces the same level of compliance as the at-
rate rule when strategic uncertainty is low, and a higher level of compliance when strategic
uncertainty is high. The bounded rule also suppresses the bomb cratere¤ect often observed in
prior studies. The results suggest that strategic uncertainty due to interactions among taxpayers
could be an e¤ective device to deter tax evasion.
JEL classication: H26; M42; C9; C72
PsycINFO classication: 3000; 4200
Keywords: Tax auditing; Tax compliance; Strategic uncertainty; Behavioral dynamics; Lab-
oratory experiment
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is as old as the income tax itself. However, it was not until 1972 that Allingham
and Sandmo presented the rst economic model of tax evasion behavior based on Gary Beckers
economics-of-crime approach (see Allingham and Sandmo (1972)). Taxpayers choose between hon-
estly stating their income or cheating on taxes, which results in either extra money if not detected,
or nancial losses otherwise. Prior research has often assumed that tax authorities audit taxpayers
with a constant and exogenous probability. We refer to this as the at-rate rule (see, e.g., Spicer
and Thomas (1982), Alm et al. (1992), Alm et al. (2009), Kastlunger et al. (2011) and Kleven et al.
(2011), as well as the literature reviews by Andreoni et al. (1998), Alm and McKee (1998), Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (2002) and Kirchler et al. (2007)).
While simple and intuitive, the Allingham-Sandmo framework neglects the potential impact of
social interactions among taxpayers. Recent tax evasion studies argue from an economic psychology
perspective that compliance decisions are a¤ected by personal, social and societal norms (Kirchler
(2007)).2 In other words, the compliance decisions of taxpayers do not merely depend on their
isolated assessments of economic variables such as income, audit probability and ne, but also
on their beliefs about what they should do and what others would do. Given the limited audit
resources of a tax authority for a xed period of time, a taxpayers belief regarding the compliance
decisions of others may a¤ect his own compliance decision and consequently the ex-post probability
of being audited. This could lead to distinctive tax evasion dynamics and equilibria across societies.
So far, most of the studies on tax compliance norms (especially social norms) elicit beliefs through
surveys or experiments concerning the extent to which people think others would evade taxes or
whether this kind of behavior could be justied (see, e.g., Torgler (2002), Wenzel (2005), Alm and
Torgler (2006)).3 This paper takes a di¤erent approach by observing evasion behavior directly
in a laboratory environment that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. We create the
strategic uncertainty by informing the taxpayers of the maximum number of audits to be carried
out, instead of telling them directly what the audit probability is. We refer to this as the bounded
rule because the number of audits is bounded by the limited resources of the tax authority.
2A personal norm, which is dened as a moral imperative that one should deliberately comply, is associated
with factors such as moral reasoning, religious beliefs and political party preference. A social norm, according to
Wenzel (2005), is prevalence or acceptance of tax evasion among a reference group (e.g. friends, colleagues or
acquaintances). A societal (or culture) norm, which reects the general attitude towards tax evasion in a large
population, is often addressed as tax morale or civic duty.
3There are a few exceptions, such as Fortin et al. (2007) and Lefebvre et al. (2011), that inform the taxpayers
of the evasion decisions of others in order to examine how the information would a¤ect the taxpayerscompliance
decisions.
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Studying the bounded rule is interesting for two reasons. First, the bounded rule naturally
incorporates the analysis of beliefs via game theory. Since the tax authority only conducts a xed
number of audits, the actual audit probability faced by a taxpayer is endogenously determined by
the evasion decisions of other taxpayers. Consequently, a taxpayer has to infer the audit probability
by forming expectations on the decisions of others. The second reason is that, the bounded rule,
relative to the at-rate rule, describes the actual auditing practice more realistically. Most organi-
zations, public and private alike, plan their activities such as auditing according to the committed
budget of a period. Once the budget is allocated for a certain purpose, it becomes di¢ cult to be
reshu­ ed during the course of a scal year. Given the xed audit capacity of a tax authority in a
certain period, it is di¢ cult to commit to a pre-specied audit probability.
This paper studies two research questions. First, could the bounded rule induce the same level
of compliance as the at-rate rule widely studied in the literature? Second, how does the level of
strategic uncertainty a¤ect behavior? That is, how do taxpayers react when they are less certain
about the actual audit probability as a result of peer interactions? In such circumstances, are they
more likely to think that others will cheat on taxes?
We take an experimental approach to examine these questions. Compared to empirical data
from the eld, the laboratory o¤ers tight controls on the tax-reporting institutions such as audit
probability, tax rate, and income level. By carefully selecting the relevant parameters, we can
directly compare the actual compliance behavior under the two auditing rules which are equally
deterrent in theory. Moreover, we can measure tax evasion behavior repeatedly and inexpensively
in the laboratory without the errors that may otherwise occur in eld data (for more discussion on
the methodology of experimental methods on tax evasion, see, e.g., Alm and McKee (1998) and
Torgler (2002)).
Our laboratory setting follows the key features of a classical tax compliance game rst developed
by Graetz et al. (1986). Every taxpayer has a certain probability of receiving high or low income.4
Knowing a certain auditing rule (at-rate or bounded), they have to decide simultaneously and
independently whether or not they will report their income truthfully to the tax authority. Then
the tax authority implements the auditing rule, depending on the treatments. In the at-rate
rule treatment, every low-income report is audited with a constant probability. In contrast, the
bounded rule audits a randomly selected sample of low-income reports whenever the number of
4Such a binary-income setting, or similar discrete-type extensions, are used in many studies (e.g., Mills and
Sansing (2000), Alm and McKee (2004), and some others cited in footnote 4 of Yim (2009)).
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these reports exceeds the maximum number of audits allowed by the budget. Otherwise, it audits
all of the low-income reports.
To examine our rst research question, we select parameters for the bounded rule such that 1)
the theoretically predicted deterrence e¤ect of the bounded rule in this treatment is statistically
equivalent to that of the at-rate rule; and 2) the level of strategic uncertainty is low, such that prot
maximizers have a dominant strategy to cheat on taxes. To study the second question, we increase
the level of strategic uncertainty faced by taxpayers. As a result, the equilibria depend on the
independent beliefs of the taxpayers. If they are too optimistic (pessimistic) about other taxpayers
propensity to cheat, they will tacitly coordinate to cheat (to report truthfully) in equilibrium.
The main results of our experiment are as follows. Supporting our hypothesis, the compliance
levels of the bounded rule and the at-rate rule are statistically the same when strategic uncertainty
is low. When the level of strategic uncertainty increases, the bounded rule becomes more e¤ective
in deterring tax evaders, even though the maximum number of audits of a tax authority does not
change. The data also suggest that the bounded rule suppresses the bomb cratere¤ect observed
in previous studies, which refers to a pattern whereby evasion is high immediately after an audit.
While the bomb crater e¤ect still exists under the at-rate rule, the opposite takes place under the
bounded rule: Subjects become more compliant immediately after an audit.5
This paper makes several contributions to the economic psychology literature on tax compliance.
Our experiment provides evidence suggesting that strategic uncertainty could help to deter tax
evasion. Under the bounded rule, even though taxpayers may be aware of the limited audit capacity
of a tax authority, the uncertainty about the decisions of others makes it di¢ cult to assess the actual
audit probability. This is particularly true when the degree of uncertainty is high.
In addition, this is the rst study empirically examining the bounded rule, which explicitly
models interactions among taxpayers, and therefore o¤ers a way to study the e¤ect of norms on
tax evasion decisions game theoretically. By experimentally comparing the levels of compliance
induced by the bounded rule and the widely studied at-rate rule, we set the stage for using the
bounded rule to examine the e¤ect of norms on taxpayersdecisions in the future.
Last but not least, our analysis on the dynamics of compliance behavior suggests that the e¤ect
of past audits on future behavior is tightly linked with the auditing institutions. Compared to a
at-rate rule with uncertainty arising from the nature, a bounded rule highlights the inuence of
uncertainty arising from the compliance behavior of others on the audit probability, which leads
5Kastlunger et al. (2009) call this the jump e¤ect.
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taxpayers to react di¤erently to past audits. Thus, it would be interesting to examine further the
dynamic behavioral patterns, such as the bomb crater e¤ect, in various institutions.
The idea of the bounded rule (i.e., examining up to some xed number of audits) was rst
studied in a theory paper by Yim (2009). In that paper, the tax authority interacts strategically
with taxpayers by choosing an audit capacity without openly committing to it before taxpayers
make their reporting choices. The main result is that the bounded rule can always induce the same
level of compliance as the at-rate rule of a certain given audit probability. To facilitate the design
of an experiment, we modify Yims model by allowing the tax authority to commit to a xed audit
capacity. The reason is that any o¤-equilibrium decisions by subjects taking the tax authoritys
role will have unpredictable impacts on others taking the taxpayer role, leading to unmanageable
complications in comparing the treatment results. Therefore, our experiment is not a strict test of
Yim (2009).
Our paper is related to the tax compliance literature on conditional auditing rules. Some
studies argue that an e¢ cient way to deter tax cheaters is to let audit probabilities depend on
history. Some of these studies examine a forward-looking rule in which the audit probability and
ne increase if taxpayers are caught cheating on taxes in the current period (see, e.g., Harrington
(1988), Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) and Greenberg (1984)). In contrast, Friesen (2003)
proposes an alternative rule where the ne and the audit probability decrease when taxpayers are
compliant.
Another strand of literature lets the audit probability depend on reported income. Reinganum
and Wilde (1985) analyze an audit cut-o¤policy in which an audit is triggered if the reported
income is below a certain threshold, and otherwise no audit if the reported income is above the
threshold. Follow-up papers conclude that if audit probability could depend on reported income,
then the optimal strategy for the auditor is to randomly audit individuals who report below some
threshold level of income. In equilibrium, only low-income taxpayers report honestly, while high-
income taxpayers report exactly at the threshold level (Sanchez and Sobel (1993), Cremer and
Gahvari (1996), Mookherjee and Png (1989), Scotchmer (1987), and Bayer and Cowell (2009)).
The above-mentioned rules are tested and compared in some experimental studies. For instance,
Cason and Gangadharan (2006) test the Harrington (1988) rule and nd qualitative support. Clark
et al. (2004) nd that the random auditing rule deters tax evaders more e¤ectively than do the rules
by Harrington (1988) and Friesen (2003), although at the expense of more audits. Alm et al. (1993)
experimentally compare a purely random rule, a forward (backward) -looking rule and a cut-o¤
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rule. They nd that the cut-o¤ rule is the most e¤ective in deterring tax evaders. Collins and
Plumlee (1991) report similar results. Unlike the bounded rule, however, the cut-o¤ rule requires
a large number of random audits.
In all of the papers discussed above, the attention is focused on the interaction between the
auditor and a taxpayer, without considering the interactions among taxpayers. A notable exception
is Alm and McKee (2004), who experimentally study a DIFrule that represents the IRSs audit
policy based on discriminant function (DIF) scores. The audit probability of their DIF rule depends
on the deviation of an individuals reported income from the average income reported by all other
players. This audit rule induces a coordination problem for taxpayers who want to cheat on taxes.
They nd that a DIF rule combined with some random audits are the most e¤ective mechanism in
deterring tax evasion. Our paper di¤ers from theirs in that taxpayers within a group do not always
receive the same level of income in a given period. Furthermore, the interaction induced by the
bounded rule among taxpayers does not always need to be a coordination game.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment design, proce-
dures and testing hypotheses. Section 3 reports the treatment e¤ects of the experiment. Section 4
studies the individual-level behavioral dynamics under the two auditing rules. Section 5 contains
concluding remarks. The technical details and the experiment instructions can be found in the
appendix.
2 The Experiment
2.1 Design
In all treatments of our experiment, the tax compliance game has three stages: (i) income reporting
and tax deduction, (ii) audit and ne deduction and (iii) feedback. Subjects receive either a
high income IH = e25 (H-type) or a low income IL = e10 (L-type) with probability q or 1   q,
respectively. Subjects are informed of the group size N and the probability q. Based on the capacity
constraint in the lab, the size of the taxpayer population is xed to be N = 8. The parameter q is
either 0:5 or 0:9, depending on the treatment.
During the income reporting stage, subjects have to decide simultaneously and independently
which income they should report to a tax authority which is simulated by a computer. The computer
automatically deducts taxes according to the reported income. The tax for subjects reporting a
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high incomeis TH = e12.5, whereas the tax for subjects reporting a low incomeis TL = e2.5.6
Subjects are told that taxes are deducted based on their reported income instead of received income.
For instance, if H-type players submit a low-incomereport, they receive e22.5, instead of e12.5.
Similarly, L-type players receive  e2.5, instead of e7.5, if they submit a high-income report.7
In the audit stage, depending on the treatment, the computer implements either a at-rate rule
or a bounded rule to audit low-income reports. In the experiment, high-income reports are
not audited. This is consistent with auditing practices in reality (see, e.g., the Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) guidelines by the IRS (2010)).8
Described below is the design of the three treatments of the experiment. Key parameters of the
treatments are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Experimental treatments
Treatment High-income Audit probability a Number of
probability q or capacity K subjects
Flat-rate 0.5 a = 0:4 64
Bounded 0.5 K = 2 64
Bounded-hi-q 0.9 K = 2 64
Flat-rate: In this treatment, subjects are told that low-income reports independently face
an audit probability of a = 0.4. This audit probability induces the same compliance rate as the
bounded rule does with an audit capacity K = 2.9 If subjects report honestly, nothing will happen
6Experimental parameters concerning taxation are chosen to be in line with reality. For instance, the real-world
tax rates for high-income and low-income taxpayers are usually dependent on the levels of their incomes. In particular,
many countries (such as Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the USA) use a progressive tax system instead
of a proportional one. Hence, this experiment adopts a progressive tax system for the sake of facilitating subjects
understanding.
7Even when a subject with a low income makes a loss by submitting a high-income report and that decision
is selected for payment, the potential loss is covered by a show-up fee of e3. During the experiment sessions, this
situation never actually arose.
8Though stylized, the binary-income setting captures some salient features of audit selection in reality. For
example, low-income taxpayers in the setting have no incentive to submit high-income reports. So these reports
must have been submitted by high-income taxpayers. Because auditing such reports cannot lead to higher tax revenue,
these reports are not audited under either of the audit rules considered in our experiment. Indeed, the IRM prescribes
that [c]lassiers [who review computer-prescreened tax returns to determine which are to be put forth for examination
(i.e., audit)] should compare the potential benets to be derived from examining a return to the resources required
to perform the examination. Although you may identify some potentially good issues on the return, if they would
not yield a signicant adjustment, the return should be accepted as led.(emphasis added) (see paragraph 1 of IRM
4.1.5.1.5.1.1 (10-24-2006) in Section 5 Classication and Case Buildingof the manual). In line with this, a recent
study by Phillips (2010) shows that the IRS focuses on auditing taxpayers expected to have high unmatched income
(i.e., income cannot be cross-checked with third-party reports such as Form W-2) and rarely examines taxpayers
likely to have only matched income.
9As a at-rate rule induces all-or-none behavior in compliance in our setting, such a rule with an audit proba-
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to their nal payo¤s. If cheaters are caught by the tax authority, they need to pay their evaded
taxes of e10 plus a ne of F = e10.
Bounded: In this treatment, the ne for cheaters is exactly the same as in the Flat-rate treatment.
The audit probability, however, depends on the total number of low-incomereports received. The
maximum number of audits to be conducted is K = 2. This value of the parameter guarantees a
unique Nash equilibrium based on non-cooperative game theory (see Section 2.3 and the appendix
for details). Setting K = 2 means that if the number of low-income reports does not exceed
two, then all of those reports will be audited with probability 1. Otherwise, the audit probability
decreases monotonically with the number of low-income reports, denoted by L. In particular,
the probability is 0.67 for L = 3; 0.5 for L = 4; 0.4 for L = 5; 0.33 for L = 6; 0.29 for L = 7; 0.25
for L = 8.
Bounded-hi-q: Except for the ex-ante probability q of receiving a high income, this treatment
is the same as the Bounded treatment.10 Compared to the Bounded treatment, subjects cheating
in this treatment face a higher degree of uncertainty given the low probability of being an L-type
player. Consequently, there are fewer honest low-income reports to pool with cheated low-
income reports, making it easier for the auditor to detect cheating. The theoretical analysis
provided in the appendix shows that the game in this treatment has multiple equilibria. We are
interested in knowing whether the behavior observed in the Bounded treatment is sensitive to the
presence of multiple equilibria when q is high.
Admittedly, for each auditing probability in the at-rate rule a, there exists more than one set
of parameters N , K, and q that triggers the same level of compliance based on game theory. We
select N = 8 based on the capacity of a conventional laboratory. Given N = 8, setting K = 2
gives us the possibility to examine the various properties of the bounded rule with di¤erent levels of
strategic uncertainty (parameters qs). To maximize the salience while not to the extreme of q = 1,
such that all taxpayers in the experiment are surely H-income taxpayers, we believe q = 0:9 strikes
the best balance in this consideration.
bility a < 0:5 theoretically has the same deterrence e¤ect as the bounded rule, assuming the standard setup with
perfectly rational, risk-neutral players. We select a relatively high a to prevent readers from attributing the equivalent
underreporting rates to a low parameter a (i.e. an easy benchmark).
10A real-world example of this treatment could be an area under the jurisdiction of an IRS District O¢ ce where
taxpayers are more likely to have high income.
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2.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of Tilburg University from October to December
2009. A total of 192 students (55.21% males and 44.79% females) participated as subjects in
the experiment. Most of them majored in economics or business. The experiment instructions,
provided in Appendix B.2, were modied from those in prior tax compliance studies, namely Alm
et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2005), and Kim and Waller (2005). The experiment was conducted with
z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)).
Every treatment consists of four sessions of 16 subjects each. The duration of a session is about 1
hour (including the initial instruction and nal payment to subjects). Average earnings are e16.23
(including the e3 show-up fee). At the beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned
to the computer terminals. Before the experiment starts, subjects have to complete some exercises
making sure that they understand the rules of the tax compliance game.
The tax compliance game consists of 30 periods. At the beginning of each period, 16 subjects
are randomly allocated into two groups of eight. At the end of each period, a summary screen
is presented to subjects with feedback information including both the subjects true and reported
income, and the nal payo¤ for the period. Subjects are not informed about otherspayo¤s.
Upon nishing the tax compliance game, subjects are asked to complete a risk elicitation task
based on Holt and Laury (2002). The instructions for the risk elicitation task are handed out only
after the completion of the tax compliance game. Hence, the subjects are not aware of the existence
of the task beforehand. The task measures subjectsrisk aversion levels, which could be useful in
explaining their behavior.
At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to complete three sets of questionnaires.
The rst one explores their perception of the game, as well as the propensity for taking into
consideration of the decisions of other participants in the experiment. The second one focuses
on social background information such as gender, nationality, and years of studying economics.
The third one elicits subjects ethical orientation by the Machiavellian IV scale personality test
(see Christie and Geis (1970)). This test measures a persons predisposition to act in accordance
to ones own interests over ethical standards. A higher score indicates that a person is more
individualistic and loosely bound to conventional moral standards.
During the payment stage, one period of the tax compliance game and the realization of one
lottery of the risk elicitation task are randomly selected to determine the nal payment to each
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subject. This random payment scheme mitigates the potential income e¤ect that the subjects carry
across di¤erent periods of the game and over to the risk elicitation task.
2.3 Hypotheses
To derive testable hypotheses, we start by assuming that players are self-interested prot maximiz-
ers. We then discuss how personal and social norms a¤ect the robustness of predictions.
In this study, the deterrence e¤ect is indicated by the underreporting rate in the population:
namely, the proportion of high-income taxpayers ling low-incomereports in a certain period. As
discussed in Section 2.1, L-type players have a dominant strategy of reporting honestly, regardless
of the audit rules.11 Therefore, our analysis focuses on H-type players. In the following, let h
denote the honest-reporting choice of an H-type player, and u the underreporting choice.
Flat-rate: In this treatment with q = 0:5, the audit probability aFR is set at 0.4. Given this, an
underreporting decision is equivalent to selecting a lottery of e22.5 with probability 0.6 and e2.5
with probability 0.4. The expected payo¤ therefore is: E(u) = e22:5 0:6 +e2:5 0:4 = e14:5,
which is larger than the sure payo¤e12.5 from honest reporting. Hence, H-type players are expected
to submit low incomereports. Note that q is an exogeneous variable which does not change the
theoretical predictions even under the assumption that the subjects are risk averse.
Bounded: In this treatment (also with q = 0:5), H-type players again face the tax-evasion
gamble of choosing between a sure payo¤ of e12.5 versus a risky lottery with a high payo¤ of
e22.5, if not audited, but a low payo¤ of e2.5 otherwise. Unlike the at-rate rule, however, the
audit probability aBD is not exogenously given. Instead, it depends on the audit capacity K set at
2 and the playersperceptions about otherschoices. In particular, the audit probability perceived
by player i is a¤ected by his subjective belief about how likely a low-incomereport is submitted
by another player.
A low-incomereport could come from two sources. The rst source is from a truthful L-type
player with probability 1   q. Alternatively, it could come from H-type players who dishonestly
report that they have received a low income.If a player thinks that the underreporting probability
of H-type players i is bi, this scenario will occur with probability qbi. Hence, the overall probability
Bi of receiving a low-income report from player i is the sum of the probabilities in these two
situations: Bi = 1  q + qbi.
11The actual percentage of honest reports among L-type taxpayers are 99.68% and 99.28% across treatments,
suggesting that they do play the dominant strategy.
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The Nash equilibrium in the Bounded treatment can be solved by iterated elimination of dom-
inated strategies. The intuition is as follows. Reporting high income is a dominated strategy for
L-type players, since they have to pay a high tax and incur a lower payo¤ than they would other-
wise. If the H-type players believe that the L-types obey dominance, then the strategy of reporting
truthfully (h) is dominated. That is, even when an H-type player believes that no other players
evade taxes, the expected payo¤ of underreporting is still higher than that of honest reporting.
Such a high expected payo¤ is caused by a low audit probability strictly less than 0.5, which stems
from the fact that all of the L-type players (about half of the population) report a low income
truthfully. The calculation guarantees that evading taxes is always a best response for an H-type
player when L-type players obey dominance. Proposition 1 stated below provides the theoretical
foundation for our hypothesis for testing.
Proposition 1 With q = 0:5, the game induced by the bounded rule with K = 2 is dominance-
solvable. In equilibrium, both L-type and H-type taxpayers submit low incomereports.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix. The following hypothesis is built upon the
previous analysis.
Hypothesis 1 Given the current set of parameters, the underreporting rates in the Flat-rate treat-
ment and the Bounded treatment are the same.
The analysis so far assumes that taxpayers are all self-interested prot maximizers. However,
eld studies have categorized taxpayers as typical taxpayers, honest taxpayersor tax evaders
based on their attitudes towards tax evasion (see Kirchler (1998)). Even in controlled laboratory
experiments with low stakes and punishment, many studies still nd a considerable number of sub-
jects who constantly behave honestly (e.g., James and Alley (2002)). Recent economic-psychology
research on tax behavior has focused on the impact of norms on compliance. In particular, we con-
sider two types of norms that may a¤ect taxpayersdecisions. The rst type is the personal norm,
which is dened as a moral imperative that one should deliberately comply(Kirchler (2007), p59).
The sources of personal norms, or tax ethics, could be moral reasoning (e.g., Trivedi et al. (2003),
Kirchler (1998)), strong religious beliefs (e.g., Torgler (2003)) and political party preference (e.g.,
Wahlund (1992)). The second type of norm is the social norm, which according to Wenzel (2005),
prevalence or acceptance of tax evasion among a reference group. That means a taxpayer could
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be conditionally honest: If he believes that non-compliance is widespread and socially accepted
behavior, then he is less likely to comply.
We argue that the treatment e¤ects remain unchanged if the taxpayer population consists of
a mixture of self-interested and conditionally (intrinsically) honest players. For this conclusion
we assume that: 1) distributions of types are the same for both treatments since the subjects are
assigned randomly from a large common population; and 2) expectations are rational in equilibrium.
Self-interested prot maximizers only care about their own payo¤s, and then will choose to cheat in
both treatments. Anticipating this, conditionally honest players will assess the proportion of self-
interested prot maximizers in the population. If this proportion is large enough, they will choose
to cheat; otherwise, they will report their income honestly. Intrinsically honest players could be
considered as a special case of the conditionally honest players who (incorrectly) think that the
proportion of self-interested prot maximizers is zero. For the formal analysis, see the appendix.
Bounded -hi-q: In this treatment with q = 0:9, the bounded rule with K = 2 changes the
interaction among taxpayers into a coordination game.
Proposition 2 With q = 0:9, the game induced by the bounded rule with K = 2 has two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In the pure-strategy equilibria,
L-type taxpayers play their dominant strategy of honest reporting. Moreover, all H-type taxpayers
opt for underreporting if they believe other H-type taxpayers cheat with a probability higher than
0:432; otherwise, they all opt for honest reporting. A symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
also exists, with H-type taxpayers each underreporting with probability 0:432 and honestly reporting
with the complementary probability.
We focus on the symmetric equilibria because asymmetric equilibria, although exist in this
setting, require unrealistic coordination among the ex ante homogenous players. Theory does not
predict which equilibrium will be selected. Nonetheless, previous laboratory studies on order-
statistic coordination games (e.g., Huyck et al. (1990), Huyck et al. (1991), Blume and Ortmann
(2007), Chaudhuri et al. (2005)) and stag-hunt games (e.g., Cooper et al. (1990), Cooper et al.
(1992)) have found that coordination is di¢ cult among multiple players. Due to the attractiveness
of the secure strategy, players fail to coordinate on the payo¤dominant equilibrium. The robustness
of this result depends on a series of factors in game structures such as group size and the relative
payo¤ attractiveness of the equilibria, as well as on behavioral determinants such as initial choices
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and pre-play communication.12 Since the game structure and the design features in our Bounded-
hi-q treatment are similar to those of the coordination games tested in the previous experiments,
we also expect a stronger attraction for the risk-dominant equilibrium. That is, we hypothesize a
higher tendency for subjects to honestly report their income in the Bounded-hi-q treatment than
in the Bounded treatment.
Hypothesis 2 Given the current set of parameters and results from the previous experiments on
coordination games, the underreporting rate in the Bounded-hi-q treatment is lower than those in
the Bounded treatment.
3 Treatment E¤ects
This section focuses on the aggregate level of the compliance behavior. Table 2 summarizes the
underreporting rates across treatments. The rst three columns contain averages over 30 periods.
The next three columns are averages over the last 10 periods, where subjectsbehavior is expected to
be more stable after becoming familiar with the environment. The variable high-income frequency
is the actual frequency of the subjects being assigned as high-income taxpayers in a treatment.
Percentage of low-incomereportsis the total number of low-incomereports received divided
by 8, regardless of whether the reports are submitted by genuine low-income taxpayers or dishonest
high-income taxpayers. Underreporting rate is the percentage of times where subjects when
assigned as a high-income taxpayer submit a low-incomereport.
12For a comprehensive review on the conditions of coordination failure, see Devetag and Ortmann (2007).
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Table 2: Summary statistics of treatments
All 30 Periods Last 10 Periods
Flat-rate Bounded Bounded-hi-q Flat-rate Bounded Bounded-hi-q
All subjects
High-income frequency 0.514
(0.007)
0.491
(0.039)
0.898
(0.024)
0.527
(0.042)
0.519
(0.038)
0.908
(0.013)
Percentage of
low-incomereports
79.74%
(0.074)
78.85%
(0.015)
40.31%
(0.053)
77.97%
(0.066)
75.94%
(0.018)
32.97%
(0.055)
H-type subjects
Underreporting rate 60.83%
(0.144)
57.11%
(0.049)
33.95%
(0.038)
58.16%
(0.143)
53.32%
(0.052)
26.16%
(0.046)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p = 0.386 p = 0.564
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Note: We use each session as an independent observation. Standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical tests
on the treatment e¤ects are the two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests.
We rst focus on the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments. The top panel of the table reports
statistics concerning all subjects. The rst row of the panel indicates that the actual frequency of
being an H-type in the two treatments is very close to their ex-ante probabilities qs. The second row
displays the percentage of low-incomereports out of all reports received (i.e., the total number
of reports from L-type players or dishonest H-type players, divided by 8). The ratio is around 80%
for both treatments.
The bottom panels of the table provide data for testing our hypotheses. Our ndings are
summarized as follows:
Result 1 Hypothesis 1 is supported. The di¤erence between the underreporting rates observed in
the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments is statistically insignicant.
Support: The average underreporting rate is 60.83% in the Flat-rate treatment and 57.11% in the
Bounded treatment. A two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum test cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the underreporting rates of the two treatments are the same (p = 0:386). In the last 10
periods, the magnitude of the di¤erence in underreporting rate becomes slightly larger but is still
statistically insignicant (p = 0:564).
To see whether our conclusion on Hypothesis 1 is robust, we run a probit regression. The
dependent variable equals 1 if an H-type subject underreports in a period, and is 0 otherwise.
The independent variable indicates whether the observation comes from the Bounded or Flat-rate
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treatment (with or without social demographic controls). Regardless of the di¤erent standard error
clustering methods (i.e., by subjects or by sessions), the estimated coe¢ cient of the treatment
variable is statistically insignicant at the 5% level. This further conrms that the underreporting
rates in the two treatments are statistically indistinguishable.
The following is our result from the Bounded -hi-q treatment.
Result 2 Hypothesis 2 is supported. The underreporting rate is signicantly lower in the Bounded-
hi-q treatment than in the Bounded treatment.
Support: The average underreporting rate in the Bounded -hi-q treatment is 33:95% over all 30
periods and 26:16% over the last 10 periods. The compliance level in this treatment is the highest,
as the underreporting rate is signicantly lower compared to the Bounded treatment (p < 0:05).
The di¤erence is already salient in the rst period and remains highly signicant throughout the
other periods of the game. This result is in line with what is found in the previous literature
on coordination games. That is, the subjects in our experiment fail to coordinate on the payo¤
dominant equilibrium in which they all underreport their income.
4 Behavioral Dynamics of Tax Evasion
This section focuses on individual-level compliance behavior, and in particular, the tax evasion
dynamics. To provide a rst impression of the data, Figure 1 depicts the average underreporting
rates across treatments. The dynamics of the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments look similar. In
contrast, the average underreporting rate in the Bounded-hi-q is visibly lower and declines steadily
across periods.
One common feature shared by all treatments is that the aggregate underreporting rates uctuate
across periods. A potential explanation is that subjects attempt to assess the audit probability
subjectively based on past audit experience. In the following, we explore how the experience of
being audited in one period changes evasion decisions in subsequent periods, and whether responses
di¤er with respect to the two auditing schemes.
So far, the two established patterns observed in many previous experiments are the bomb
cratere¤ect and the echoe¤ect. The bomb cratere¤ect addresses the immediate decline in
compliance after a tax audit. This term derives from a phenomenon that soldiers in wars hide
themselves in bomb craters with the belief that it is unlikely for a bomb to fall in the same place
14
Figure 1: Dynamics of underreporting rate over 30 periods
twice. In the context of tax evasion, the bomb crater e¤ect predicts an immediate, high level
of noncompliance following an audit (see, e.g., Guala and Mittone (2005), Kirchler et al. (2005),
Mittone (2006), Bergman (2006)). Kastlunger et al. (2009) consider the noncompliance to be
mainly driven by misperception of chance, since people believe that an audit is unlikely to take
place consecutively, rather than by a motivation to repair losses in the previous period.
The echo e¤ect emphasizes the importance of an early audit. If an audit takes place in an earlier
period rather than a later period, it has a more prominent and persistent e¤ect on tax compliance
behavior (see Guala and Mittone (2005) and Mittone (2006)).
We use the following random-e¤ect probit model to examine these e¤ects.
yit = xit + ui + "it .
The variable y is equal to 1 if subjects decide to underreport, and is 0 otherwise. Furthermore, x
is a vector of explanatory variables, the ui represent individual random e¤ects and  is a vector of
coe¢ cients.
To examine the bomb crater e¤ect, we regress the underreporting decision of subject i at period t
on the previous audit experience when i received high income. The variable past audit experience
equals to 1 if subject i was caught cheating on taxes in the previous period when he received high
15
income, and 0 otherwise. As for the echo e¤ect, we introduce a term called early detection
experiencewhich equals 1 if the latest previous experience of being caught occured within the rst
10 periods.13 Genderequals 1 if a subject is male. Years of learning economicsrepresents the
number of years a subject takes economic courses. Econ experience  Game theorycounts for the
experience of learning game theory. The four dummies for nationalities represent the four largest
cohorts in our sample, with the baseline to be Europeans such as Italian, French and German.
Tax ling experienceequals 1 if a subject takes a part-time job and les taxes. Degree of risk
aversionreports the total number of safe lotteries selected in the risk elicitation task. Mach IV
scoreis based on the personality test by Christie and Geis (1970). MC1 through MC 4 document
subjectsanswers to questions 6-9 on treatment manipulations in Appendix B.2.2. For both e¤ects,
we run two specications with and without controlling for repeated interactions, social background
information (such as gender, major of study, nationality), personal characteristics (risk attitude,
Mach-IV score) and belief data (e.g. how likely it is that a subject thinks of the decisions of the
others when making his own decision). Results of the regressions are reported in Table 3.
13Other thresholds such as period 15 or period 5 do not change the signicance of the coe¢ cients for all treatments
and all specications.
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The left-hand side of Table 3 presents regression results in examination of the bomb crater
e¤ect. We nd evidence for the bomb crater e¤ect in the Flat-rate treatment. The coe¢ cient for
past auditing experience is positive but insignicant, indicating that the subjects do not exhibit
a lower propensity to evade taxes immediately after being audited. However, the bomb crater
e¤ect does not exist under the bounded rule mechanism. For both the Bounded and Bounded -hi-q
treatment, if a high-income subject was caught in underreporting taxes, he is signicantly less likely
to underreport in the subsequent period when he receives high income. This result is robust even
after controlling for the experience of play (time trend), social and personal characteristics and
belief data.
The above results show a distinctive impact of the previous auditing experience on the subsequent
evasion for the two auditing mechanisms. We replicate the bomb crater e¤ect for the Flat-rate
treatment, which shares common features with previous studies: Subjects are explicitly told that
they will be audited with a constant probability. As long as they are aware that the uncertainty
only comes from nature, they tend to overlook the fact that the likelihood of the next audit comes
from a known distribution rather than recent audits (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)).
However, probability assessment processes change for the bounded rule, as the subjects are
not informed about the exact audit probability. Apart from nature, the audit probability is also
associated with othersbeliefs and actions. Consequently, when subjects are audited, they might
overweight the probability that the audit comes from the actions of other players rather than from
nature. For conditionally honest players, the overestimation of othershonesty directly leads to a
self-fullling prophecy that they should comply in the subsequent period like most others do. This
also explains why the downward sloping trend in the Bounded -hi-q treatment is much more salient
and steady compared to that of the Bounded treatment: When the level of strategic uncertainty
is high, subjects are much more likely to attribute an experience of being caught to the honesty of
the decisions of others rather than to nature.
The right-hand panel reports the examination of the echo e¤ect. If early auditing experience has
an extra e¤ect on compliance behavior, the coe¢ cient for the variable early detection experience
should be signicant and negative. However, we do not nd this e¤ect for all treatments. In
the Bounded -hi-q treatment, an early audit experience is even less e¤ective, although this e¤ect
disappears after controlling for periods of play, social and personal characteristics and belief data.
This result contradicts the ndings of earlier studies by Mittone (2006) and Kastlunger et al. (2009).
A potential explanation is that the time horizon of our setup is not long enough to fully examine this
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question. In our 30-period experiment, a subject receives high income only about 15 times in the
Flat-rate and the Bounded treatments. On the other hand, in studies such as Mittone (2006) and
Kastlunger et al. (2009), players interact for 60 periods. For the Bounded -hi-q treatment, although
subjects have more experiences of being an H-type, the distinctive probability assessment procedure
discussed before makes the dynamics of the game quite di¤erent from those in the previous studies.
Result 3 summarizes the above ndings.
Result 3 The bounded rule and the at-rate rule result in di¤erent behavioral dynamics. The
bounded rule suppresses the bomb crater e¤ect that otherwise exists in the at-rate rule. The echo
e¤ect is not found in any treatment.
Apart from the previous auditing experience, we also detect some interesting ndings from socio-
demographics and beliefs on the evasion decision. In the Flat-rate treatment, being female, coming
from eastern Europe, choosing more safe options in the risk elicitation task, considering the tax
evasion decision to be complex and feeling obligated to report truthfully all decrease the likelihood
of cheating on taxes. In the Bounded treatment, however, social and personal characteristics seem
to impact less on behavior. Apart from the risk attitude, the only social information that a¤ects
behavior is training in economics: Players who have spent more years studying economics are
more likely to underreport. This result seems to suggest that training in economics results in
behavior more in line with the predictions made by game theory. In the Bounded -hi-q treatment,
social characteristic data have no impact on evasion behavior except for the variable that measures
personal norms. The more a subject expresses obliged to report truthfully in the post-game
questionnaire, the less they cheat on taxes in general. This shows that their reported answers are
consistent with their actual behavior in the experiment.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper experimentally examines the bounded rule as an alternative auditing mechanism that
naturally integrates game theory into the modeling of taxpayer interactions. In a tax compliance
game, subjects receive either high- or low income with a predetermined probability. On knowing a
certain auditing rule, they report income to the tax agency. In the Flat-rate treatment, participants
are told that they independently face a known audit probability. In contrast, participants in the
Bounded treatment are informed of the maximum number of audits. The experimental results
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indicate that the compliance rate in the bounded rule is the same as that in the traditional rule
when the level of strategic uncertainty is low, but becomes much higher when the level of strategic
uncertainty is high. In the presence of multiple equilibria, the bounded rule deters subjects from
coordinating on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium without any increase in the maximum number of
audits.
Similar to previous experimental studies on the coordination game, the underreporting rate
declines drastically in the Bounded -hi-q treatment, demonstrating again the attraction of the safe
strategy. These ndings could be explained by the fact that people are generally strategic uncer-
tainty averse (see, e.g., Heinemann et al. (2009)). According to Brandenburger (1996)s denition,
strategic uncertainty arises when there is uncertainty concerning the purposeful behavior of play-
ers in an interactive decision situation, as opposed to a game against nature. When people are
strategic uncertainty averse, they will prefer a sure, safe outcome to a better but riskier one with
a realized probability depending on the decisions of others. In the bounded rule treatment, even
though jointly underreporting income yields a higher ex post income for every H-type subject, it is
di¢ cult for them to fully ensure that others also think in the same way. Lacking the opportunity to
communicate or pre-commit to the risky decision, subjects prefer to choose a safe strategy. In sum-
mary, strategic uncertainty aversion should be further explored as a powerful source of deterrence
in audit mechanism design.
The results also show that individual behavioral dynamics are institution-dependent. We nd
that the bounded rule decreases the bomb crater e¤ect possibly via the individualsperception of
the auditing experience. Although we do not elicit beliefs in our current setup, we could still infer
from the reactions of the participants that they are more likely to associate the audit experience
with the compliance decisions of others than with probability assessment (otherwise, we would
observe similar results as in the Flat-rate treatment). Our paper echoes a nding of Kastlunger
et al. (2009) that the bomb crater e¤ect could disappear by merely changing the sequence of random
audits. Future studies are needed to explore the robustness of behavior dynamics to the changes
of institutional environment such as auditing rules, time horizon, etc.
This study is the rst step into the investigation of the bounded rule empirically. In our current
setup, taxpayers can only decide whether to underreport or honestly report. In future studies, the
model could be extended to allow choices as to the extent of underreporting. Another possible
extension might involve introducing a human auditor to further examine the strategic interactions.
In our current setup, subjects are not allowed to exchange information with each other in order
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to be consistent with most of the tax compliance experiments. Yet, in reality, taxpayers do have
opportunities to communicate with each other. For instance, Alm and McKee (2004) show that
such cheap-talk communication could help taxpayers to coordinate on a zero-compliance (payo¤-
dominant) equilibrium. However, if a strategic auditor could observe this, she could adjust the
audit capacity accordingly to combat collusion among taxpayers.
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Appendix
A Technical Details and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
This subsection contains two parts. The rst part proves that given that all players are rational,
strategic expected prot maximizers, the game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance solv-
able. The second part shows that this claim still holds by introducing conditionally or intrinsically
honest players.
The proof is trivial that reporting high income is a dominated strategy for the L-type players. To
prove that the best response of H-type players is underreporting given that L-type players display
dominance, the expected payo¤ from underreporting should be strictly larger than the sure payo¤
from reporting truthfully. Moreover, this holds regardless of the beliefs that H-type players hold
towards the other H-types.
First assume that an H-type player anticipates that nobody else will underreport. That is,
b0 = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1) = (0; 0:; ; ; 0). In this situation, low-incomereports are submitted by only
L-types. Since the probability of being an L-type is q = 0:5 for every other player, the probability
that exactly n out of N   1 players submit low-incomereports follows the binomial distribution
Bin (n;N   1; q) = Bin (n; 7; 0:5). The expected payo¤ from underreporting is therefore:
E(ljb0) =
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; q) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
= S   (S   F )
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 22:5  20
7P
n=0
Bin(n; 7; 0:5)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 12:698
The sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully is 12:5. Hence, a self-interested, risk neutral H-type
player will underreport.
The remaining proof shows that for any given set of beliefs held by an H-type player, the expected
payo¤ from underreporting is always at least E(ljb0). Assume that player N thinks that the rst
N   1 players underreport with probability b = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1). The probability that player i
submits low-incomeis Bi = 1  q + qbi = 12(1 + bi). Note that Bi 2 [12 ; 1]. To facilitate notation,
A -1
dene an index vector I = (i1; i2; :::i7), with i1 6= i2 6= :::i7. Each index takes a value from the set
f1; 2; :::; 7g. The probability that n out of 7 other players submit low-incomereports is:
Pr(njb) =
Cs7P
s=1
sQ
j=1
Bij
i7Q
k=s+1
(1 Bik)
The expected payo¤ from underreporting is therefore:
E(ljb) =
N 1P
n=0
Pr(njb) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
It turns out that for any given bi, @E(l)=@bi = (@E(l)=@Bi)  (@Bi=@bi) > 0.14 This means
that the expected payo¤ from underreporting is increasing in the (subjective) propensity to evade
taxes. Hence, given any set of beliefs b = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1), E(ljb)  E(ljb0). Hence, the best
response of the H-type players is to underreport.
The second part of this subsection proves that the introduction of conditionally or intrinsically
honest players does not change the directions of treatment di¤erence.
Let  be the probability that a player is conditionally honest, and 1   be the probability that
a player is a strategic, self-regarding prot maximizer, where 0   < 1. We do not allow  = 1,
since at least one strategic player is thinking of this problem. In our setting, in particular, the
number of conditionally honest players N can be any number from 0 to 7 out of 8 players. We
further assume that the  is the same in both treatments.
The strategy of the conditionally honest players is as follows. When they receive low income,
they will always report truthfully. When they receive high income, they will honestly report their
income if they think that the number of players cheating on taxes (1   )N is not higher than a
certain threshold  2 [0; 7], and will underreport their income otherwise.
To prove the statement, we rst show that the inclusion of these players does not a¤ect the
strategy of the prot maximizers. When the strategic players are assigned to be L-types, they gain
a higher payo¤ by reporting truthfully, regardless of the auditing rule implemented. In the Flat-
rate treatment, H-type prot maximizers only compare a sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully and the
expected payo¤ from the tax evasion gamble if they underreport. Hence, the existence of honest
players will not a¤ect their choices. In the Bounded treatment, the subjective beliefs of strategic,
H-type players regarding the number of low-incomereports now become Bi = (1  q)+ q(1 )b.
Given that q = 0:5, 0   < 1, B still lies in the interval [12 ; 1]. Therefore, Proposition 2 still holds.
14Calculations are available upon request.
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Anticipating that strategic prot maximizers will cheat when they receive high income, the
conditional honest players will assess the proportion of self-interested prot maximizers in the
population. If the proportion is (1 )N 6 , they will honestly report their income. If (1 )N > ,
they will underreport.
We assume that belief is mutually rational in equilibrium. Hence, in the presence of conditionally
honest players, the non-compliance rates of both treatments become:
P
Bin(n;N; q)(1  ) =
8<: (1  ) if (1  )N 6 1 if (1  )N > 
The analysis of intrinsically honest players is simpler, since their strategies could be reformulated
by setting  = 7. As (1   )N 6 7 always holds, the compliance rates of both treatments with
intrinsically honest players become:
P
Bin(n;N; q)(1  ) = (1  )
A.2 The Existence of Coordination
If this game is a coordination game, there exists a b 2 [0; 1] such that the payo¤ from underreporting
is equal to the honest payo¤:
E(u;N; q;K; bi) =
N 1X
n=0
Bin(n;N   1;Bi) [(1  aBD) (IH   TL) + aBD  (IH   TH   F )]
= IH   TH .
Due to the discrete nature of the distribution, a direct proof is di¢ cult. However, just for
illustration purposes, if N is large, the expected number of low-incomereports is BiN = [(1  
q) + qbi]N . The expected prot from underreporting could be simplied as
E(u) =
K
BiN
(IH   TH   F ) + (1  K
BiN
)(IH   TL)
= IH   TH .
Solving the equation yields Bi = K(TH + F   TL)=N(TH   TL). Hence, there exists a set of
parameters K, TH , F , TL, N and q such that Bi 2 (0; 1). Thus, in certain parameter domains,
the H-type players under the bounded rule nd themselves indi¤erent between underreporting and
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honestly reporting if bi = b =
Bi (1 q)
q . If bi > b, then the H-types all underreport; if bi < b, then
the H-types all report honestly.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let i(j) be the probability that type i player (H-type or L-type) will use strategy j (u or h).
There are two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in this treatment:
f(H(u) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(h) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(u) = 0:432; L(h) = 1)g.
In other words, the two pure Nash equilibria are 1) all H-type players underreport and 2) all H-type
players report honestly. L-type players always report honestly.
Let us examine the former case. Given that an H-type player thinks that all other H-types
choose strategy u, he will have an expected payo¤ of 17.5 by playing strategy l. By deviating to
h, the payo¤ decreases to 12.5. Since we assume symmetry among players, no one has an incentive
to deviate from underreporting, which constitutes an NE. A highly similar analysis applies to the
latter case. Given that all other H-type players play strategy h, a strategy deviation from h to l
will yield a lower expected payo¤ for H-type players (from 12.5 to 3.59). Hence, no one has an
incentive to deviate.
On top of the two pure equilibria, the game also has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
each H-type player is indi¤erent between the strategy of reporting honestly and underreporting.
Given the game parameters, the underreporting probability b that induces utility indi¤erence is
bSE = 0:432.
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B Instructions
B.1 Instructions Comparison
The instructions given in the next subsection are for the Bounded treatment. These instructions
di¤er from those given for the other treatments as follows:
 Flat-rate treatment
1. The second bullet (concerning matching protocol) of the list under Task Description
in the instructions for the Tax Compliance Gameis absent.
2. The Audit Probability Tableis absent.
3. The phrase see audit prob. tablein the Payo¤ Tablebecomes 0.4.
 Bounded-hi-q treatment
1. In the third bullet of the list under Task Descriptionin the instructions for the Tax
Compliance Game, the probability of receiving e25 becomes 0.9; accordingly, the prob-
ability of receiving 10 becomes 0.1.
2. In the Payo¤ Table (immediately before Payment Method in the instructions for
the Tax Compliance Game), the probabilities in the second column become 0.9 and
0.1, respectively.
B.2 Instructions for the Bounded Treatment
 Please read these instructions carefully!
 Please do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the entire experiment.
 If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to you to answer it.
 You will receive a show-up fee of e3 for completing all tasks in the experiment, independent
of your performance.
Task Description
 This session consists of 30 periods of play; each period is completely independent of the others.
A -5
 Of the participants in the room, two groups of 8 participants will be randomly formed at the
beginning of each period. You will not know the identity of the other players in your group
in any period.
 At the beginning of each period, you will receive a taxable income of either e25 or e10. The
probability of receiving e25 is 0.5; the probability of receiving e10 is 0.5.
 Your task is to report your income to the auditor, which is played by a computer. The amount
that you report is your decision. You can report either e25 or e10, regardless of your received
income.
After-tax Income Determination
Your after-tax income in this period is determined by the following two steps: tax payment and
an audit.
Step One: Tax payment
The tax rate is 50% for those who reported e25 and 25% for those who reported e10. Suppose
the income you received is e25:
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals e25 e12.5 = e12.5.
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals e25 e2.5 = e22.5.
Suppose the income you received is e10:
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals e10 e2.5 = e7.5.
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax. So your
after-tax income in this period equals e10 e12.5 = -e2.5.
 In sum, the auditor charges tax based on your reported income, instead of your received
income.
Step Two: Audit
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The auditor does not know your received income unless your report is audited later.
Auditing procedure:
 If your reported income is e25, you will not be audited. That means what you have earned
in step one (e12.5 or -e2.5) will be your after-tax income (if your received income is e25 and
e10, respectively).
 Regardless of your received income, if your reported income is e10, there is a chance that
your report will be audited. The outcome is as follows:
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is also e10. Then what
you have earned in step one (e7.5) will be your after-tax income, no matter whether
your report is audited or not.
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is e25. If your report
is not audited, you will keep the e22.5 earned in step one; if audited, you will get e2.5.
Auditing probability:
The number of reports the auditor will audit depends on the number of players reporting an
income of e10 in a group.
- If the number of e10 income reports is equal to two or less, the auditor will audit all of the
e10 reports.
- If the number of e10 income reports is three or more, then two out of such reports will be
randomly selected for audit.
 The Audit Probability Tablebelow shows the audit probabilities for a player who reported
an income of e10.
Audit Probability Table
Number of e10 reports 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Audit Probability 100% 100% 100% 66:7% 50% 40% 33:3% 28:6% 25%
 The Payo¤ Tablebelow summarizes all of the possible scenarios you may encounter in one
period and the related payo¤s:
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Payo¤ Table
Received Probability Reported Audit After-tax Income After-tax Income
Income Income Probability if audited if NOT audited
e25 0:5 e25 0 e12:5 e12:5
e10 see audit prob. table e2:5 e22:5
e10 0:5 e10 see audit prob. table e7:5 e7:5
e25 0  e2:5  e2:5
Payment Method
 At the end of this experiment, one out of 30 periods will be selected to determine your payo¤
for this task. The computer program will generate a random number from 1 to 30. This
number will determine one of the 30 periods. Your performance in that period determines
your payo¤.
 You will be paid based on your after-tax income for the randomly selected period.
 Because each period is equally likely to be selected for payment determination, you should
make your decision in each period as if that period would be selected for payment.
 Your payo¤ will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment along with your earnings
in the other task(s).
We will now show you what the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
Period     1 out of 30                                                Remaining time [sec]:  36
Your taxable income is: € 25
        What is the amount of income you report to the auditor?
Your Decision: €10 口
€ 25 口
Report___
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In Screen 1, you can decide the amount of income to report to the auditor. Please select either
e10or e25, and conrm your choice by pressing the Reportbutton.
Warning: Before pressing the button, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your
decision after you have pressed OK.
SCREEN 2
Period       1 out of 30 Remaining time [sec]: 40
                      The results of this period are as follows:
    Income you received: € 25
Income you reported: € 10
    Your after-tax income in this period: €22.5
OK___
Screen 2is the feedback table you will receive regarding your after-tax income. You will nd
information on the initial taxable income you received, the income you reported and your after-tax
income in this period.
Click on OK when you nish checking the information.
Note that the purpose of the screen shots is to clarify the procedure, rather than provide advice
about how to act. You should make the decisions that are best for you.
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B.2.1 Risk Elicitation Task15
Task Description
In this task, you are asked to make decisions related to 21 choice pairs. In each choice pair, you
need to select between two lotteries labeled Lottery Aand Lottery B. Please, take your time
and read each choice pair carefully. An example of a typical choice pair is given below:
Choice Lottery A e5.5 with probability 0.5 or e3.5 with probability 0.5 Your Lottery A 
No.1 Lottery B e9 with probability 0.5 or e0.5 with probability 0.5 choice: Lottery B 
Payment Method
 You need to make choices for all 21 choice pairs. However, only one of the 21 choices you have
made will be chosen for the payo¤ determination of this task. First, the computer program
will generate a random number from 1 to 21. This number will determine a choice pair. Then,
the computer program will simulate the lottery you have chosen and reveal the outcome on
your screen. The outcome of this lottery will determine your payo¤.
 For example, suppose that the computer program has generated a random number 2. It will
then check what you have selected in choice pair number 2. Suppose that you have chosen
Lottery A in that choice pair. Then the computer program will simulate Lottery A and
reveal your payo¤ (either e5.5 or e3.5). Your payo¤ will be paid out in cash at the end of
the experiment along with your earnings for the other task.
It is important that you fully understand the lottery selection task. Please raise your hand if
you have any questions at this moment.
B.2.2 Post-experimental Questions
Questions on Treatment Manipulation Please evaluate the following statements with respect
to the tax reporting task:16
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly agree,
6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly agree
15The risk elicitation task is conducted after the tax compliance game. However, the subjects do not know the
existence of this task when they are playing the game.
16The rst ve questions are used to understand the subjectsperception about the experimental setup and instruc-
tions in general. We do not expect to nd di¤erences across treatments. The last ve questions focus on capturing
di¤erent types of manipulations of the treatments; therefore, we expect to see di¤erences across manipulations.
A -10
1. The instructions were clearly formulated.
2. I felt that I performed well on the task.
3. I received plenty of time to carry out the task.
4. I was motivated to do well on the task.
5. The task was fun to perform, motivating me to achieve a payo¤ as high as possible.
6. I considered the tax reporting task to be fairly complex.
7. My payo¤ is determined not only by my own decision, but also by the decisions of the other
players.
8. When making my decision, I thought about what other players might do.
9. I feel obliged to report the received income in each period.
10. The chance I have received e25 is about 50%.17
Questions on Background Information
Please answer the following survey questions. Your answers will be used for this study only.
Individual data will not be exposed.
1. What is your gender?
2. What is your nationality?
3. How many years have you already studied economics?
4. Have you ever had a course related to game theory?
5. Have you ever had a part-time job?
17 In the Bounded-hi-q treatment, the chance should be 90%, instead of 50%.
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Questions on Mach IV Scale18
In the following you will nd a list of statements. Please read them carefully and indicate to
what extent you agree or disagree. Even if in some cases you would like to say that your answers
depend on the circumstances, you should only choose one of the answers. Since all responses are
anonymous, you can answer freely. There is nobody on whom you need to make a good impression.
Only if you answer very honestly can the results be used.
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly
agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly disagree
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Most people are basically good and kind.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are
given a chance.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, people wont work hard unless theyre forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting
it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
13. The biggest di¤erence between most criminals and other people is that the criminals are
stupid enough to get caught.
18Questions 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16 and 17 are reverse coded.
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14. Most people are brave.
15. It is wise to atter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that theres a sucker born every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
19. People su¤ering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to
death.
20. Most people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their property.
A -13
